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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

MR. BRADLEY, BAIN, AND PRAGMATISM

IT would appear from Mr. D. S. Robinson's article in this JOURNAL[1] that it is still thought adequate by the traditional intellectualism to say that pages 18–22 of Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Principles of Logic,* which profess to deal with certain views of the late Professor Alexander Bain, contain, by anticipation, a complete refutation of pragmatism. He asserts, amid other surprising allegations,[2] that "Bain actually anticipated pragmatic logic by advocating the identical notion of judgment which Dr. Schiller has openly espoused" and refers to "Mr. Bradley's trenchant and hitherto unanswered criticism of Bain's theory of practical belief," as something which will be news to me and may even "benefit" me by rescuing me from "the pitfall of arguing that all judgments are practical."

It would appear, therefore, that not only is Mr. Robinson unacquainted with my comments on these ancient allegations,[3] but also that it may still be a real service both to the philosophic issues of the day and to accurate historical scholarship to consider what precisely are the real relations between (I.) Bain's doctrine, (II.) Mr. Bradley's version of it, (III.) his criticism of it, and (IV.) pragmatism and the first three.

I.

Bain's doctrine appears most fully in the third edition of *The Emotions and the Will* (1875). It concerns the theory, *not of Judgment,* but of *Belief.*[4] Belief, he points out, has not only an intel-

[1] XIV., 9, p. 225.

[2] Such as that Aristotle, in *Eth. Nicom.,* VI., 9, and VII., 5(13), "shows clearly what the application of logic to action is." It would be highly instructive to learn from Mr. Robinson what he thinks the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism really is, how it applies to action, and how it can be made 'clear.' If he undertakes this, I shall be happy to assist by referring him to some other relevant passages in Aristotle, because I greatly fear he will not be able to quote a completely stated, and still less a completely analyzed, 'practical syllogism' from the *Ethics.*

[3] *Cf. Studies in Humanism,* p. 133.

[4] Pp. 505–38.

lectual, but also a volitional side, and is not an affair of knowledge only; for "we may equally know what we believe and what we disbelieve—truth and error." It has also to be distinguished from Emotion, though emotions may accompany it. "Fictitious narratives may stir the mind more strongly than real. We may disbelieve and yet tremble." But Belief is "essentially related to Action." Preparedness to act upon what we affirm is admitted on all hands to "be the sole, the genuine, the unmistakable criterion of belief." Thus Columbus, when he sailed west to get to India, effectively showed his belief in the earth's roundness.

It is pointed out further that mere action upon organic impulse is not properly belief; action having reference to the future is required. So is cognizance of the order of nature, in which trust is put; otherwise belief is not to be distinguished from "fancy." "The genuineness of this state of belief is tested by the control of actions," *i. e.*, by our willingness to act on it. The consequences of this nature of belief "spread far and wide into the realms of intelligence and speculation,"[5] for though, "as the intellectual functions are developed . . . the materials of belief are more and more abundantly reaped from their proper field,"[5] "we must not depart from their reference to action," and though, "as the sphere of pure intelligence grows larger there is a progressive storing up of facts and laws, without any immediate regard to practical ends," . . . "there lurks a tacit appeal to action in the belief entertained respecting all that unapplied knowledge."[5]

It is, of course, noted that "belief varies in Degree" and that its strength is tested by the vigor in the pursuit of ends believed in strongly and the elation or depression entailed by success or failure. The origin of Belief is traced to Primitive Credulity. "We begin by believing everything; whatever is, is true." But Experience undeceives us; it depresses expectations and moderates our beliefs. For it can confront us with present fact that checks our credulity; indeed it is just out of such conflicts that beliefs proper arise. Subsequently we find some judicious remarks on the influence on belief of Emotion, Bias, and the Will (to believe, *etc.*).

Now it is true that Mr. Bradley does not use this third edition of *The Emotions and the Will* for the purpose of criticizing Bain. He declares (p. 22, *n.*) that as he is "entirely unable to understand" the theory in it (which is his way of saying that he can pick no holes in it) his remarks "must be taken to apply to the earlier one." To *which* earlier one, he does not say. I can not find, however, that there is any vital difference between the doctrines of the first edition and of the third. The last has been rewritten and considerably

[5] Also in the first edition, p. 571.

improved in statement; it is more lucid and precise, but the general doctrine is the same, and many of the most important passages quoted stand already in the first edition. Some rather vague phrases are gone, but as they may have provoked Mr. Bradley's onslaught, they must here be mentioned. Bain had affirmed (p. 568) "that belief has no meaning, except in reference to our actions; the essence, or import of it is such as to place it under the region of the will." But he added at once that "an intellectual notion, or conception, is likewise indispensable to the act of believing." So "while action is the basis and ultimate criterion, of belief, there enters into it as a necessary element some cognizance of the order of nature" (p. 570). Finally (pp. 594–5) he reiterated that in order to discriminate beliefs and "mere conceptions involving no belief" reference must be made to "action, as the only test and the essential import of the state of conviction. Even in cases the farthest removed in appearance from any actions of ours, there is no other criterion." For "the genuineness of a conviction is notoriously open to question, until an opportunity for acting presents itself."

It will be seen even from these brief abstracts that Bain's study of Belief is comprehensive, sensible and humane. It is entirely devoid of extravagance and defends no paradox, but endeavors honestly to do justice to the various aspects of the complex psychological state of belief. Its whole tone and atmosphere is, of course, congenial with pragmatism, but no philosopher need be ashamed to learn from it. Its problems, however, are not identical with those which pragmatism has raised into controversial issues. Its point of view is not logical, but psychological. It is not concerned with the logical nature of Judgment: indeed, the term does not occur anywhere in it. The problem which leads to the emphasis on the practical reference of belief is manifestly the difficulty of distinguishing *genuine* from *spurious* belief. How are we to know whether a man really believes what he professes? How are we to detect him when he is deceiving himself or others, *i. e.*, lying? Bain tells us to *watch his acts,* and the advice is probably the best that can be given, though it does not exhaust the subject. For clearly certain reservations must be made in the case of hypocrites, whose acts may lie as cleverly as their words, of actors, whose business is to act parts that do not necessarily express their character, and many types of self-deception, insincerity, mental confusion, hysteria, and dissociation, in all of which acts may occur which are no adequate test of the general character. Again it is plain that whether the test by action amounts to a "criterion" or not, depends on whether a "criterion" is, or is not, held to connote absoluteness and infallibility; but this question is verbal and not important.

Lastly, the phrases "essentially related" and "essential import" are conventional, and must not be pressed—at all events until some philosopher has contrived to show that absolute "essences" exist and how they are distinguishable from "accidents."

II.

Such being Bain's authentic doctrine, let us follow its Circean transformation in Mr. Bradley's hands, which Mr. Robinson invites us to admire. This transformation was no doubt occasioned by the difficulty, in every logic which retains the old abstract and absolute separation of logic and psychology, of accommodating so "psychological" a subject as belief; but this hardly justifies the omission, not only of any warning that what is presented as a theory of judgment was intended as an analysis of belief, but also of exact quotation and of any reference that could lead to an identification and verification of the incriminated doctrine. The most remarkable features of the transformation wrought by Mr. Bradley upon Bain's theory may be gathered from the following extracts.

The theory is first described as a "confusion of judgment with practical belief," and inquiry is then made whether "the essence of judgment lies . . . in the actual production of a change in real existence. Or, more simply, when an idea is judged to be true, does this mean that it *moves* some other phenomenon and that its assertion or denial is nothing but this motion? The doctrine admits that an idea or ideas when held true differ vitally from the same when suggested; and it proceeds to assert that the *differentia* is the effect of the idea on our conduct, and that there is no other *differentia* at all." Soon after we are told that Bain's assertion "is *not* that practical influence induces us to judge or results from a judgment: What is asserted is that judgment *is* nothing else whatever" (p. 18). "Against the false *differentia*" Mr. Bradley undertakes to show "(*a*) that the *differentia* may be absent from the fact, (*b*) that it may be present with other facts, (*c*) that the fact contains other characteristics which are the true *differentia* and are absent from the false, and (*d*) that the latter has a positive quality which excludes the fact" (p. 19).

But before we plunge into Mr. Bradley's proofs of all this, let us pause a little to recover our breath, and to express our amazement at the extraordinary divergence between Bain's text and the perversion foisted upon him. Not only is it impossible to identify the two versions, or to regard them as compatible, but even to trace any relevant similarity between them and to find any point of contact. They do not deal with the same problems nor speak the same language. Mr. Bradley's version is not Bain; strictly speak-

ing it does not even *profess* to be Bain, seeing that it ignores the matured statement of his doctrine. But it is as little relevant to Bain's first edition as to his third. Neither, *a fortiori*, is it pragmatism, ancient or modern, divined prophetically or conjured up out of the pit, in any form known to science.

Moreover, the doctrine it amuses Mr. Bradley to castigate is not even so stated as to be intelligible. We are not told *how* judgment is supposed either to *originate in* practise or to *influence* practise or to *be* "nothing but practical influence," nor even in which of these very different positions it is really to be found. Nor is it possible to conjecture what is meant by the dictum that "a true idea *moves* some other phenomenon, and that its assertion or denial is nothing but this motion." Where does the "true idea" move what, and how? In its local habitat, the brain? That would seem to be the only place where "ideas" can be conceived to be immediate causes of motion. But how is such an idea or such motion a "phenomenon"? The only other thing an "idea" might seem capable of setting in motion is a tongue; but *false* ideas seem just as potent to set tongues wagging as *"true."* And by what magic arts of exegesis are the doctrines that beliefs have a practical test of their genuineness, or even that judgments have a practical function, transformed into this unmeaning nonsense?

Nor is Mr. Bradley's "Bain" merely nonsense that can not be traced to any authentic source. It is not even consistent nonsense. In one place we are told that the execrable error holds that "judgment *is* nothing else" but practical influence; in another, that its "essence" alone "lies in the production of a change." Unless, therefore, the whole nature of judgment is absorbed into its "essence," and judgment admits of no "accidents," *i. e.*, is necessarily "true" and never "false," these statements are incompatible. Neither of them, however, is insisted on when Mr. Bradley proceeds to dismember his man of straw; what is then criticized is mainly the assertion that ideas always exert a practical influence (p. 19), or that all judgment moves to action (p. 20), or that "Belief must induce action" (p. 21).

III.

In detail, Mr. Bradley endeavors to prove against his "Bain," (*a*) that the *differentia*, "practical influence," may be absent from judgment. He "tests" it by abstract instances drawn from geometry. He assures us that when it hears that "the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it collapses at once." We are bound to take Mr. Bradley's word for it, though we should not otherwise have supposed that his cockshy could have stood up enough even to

be bowled over. But a pragmatic logician might here convict Mr. Bradley's objection of arrant Formalism. For of course his specimen of a geometrical "truth" is a mere paper judgment. If and when it was used, and became a real judgment, there would have to be a context, and a purpose and a particular situation, to which it was relevant and then the "practical influence" it exerted would speedily be found in them. At any rate neither Mr. Bradley nor any other philosopher goes about reciting geometrical truths at large and at random.

(*b*) It is argued that practical influence can not be the *differentia*, because "ideas may influence me, though I never do hold them for true." This objection to his "Bain" Mr. Bradley has actually *borrowed* from the real Bain. Both agree that we may "disbelieve and yet tremble,"[6] *e. g.*, in passing a "haunted" churchyard. And the doctrine of both may be *wrong*. For as Mr. Bradley confesses, in an interesting footnote, *more sus*, the right analysis of such cases may be that when we tremble our disbelief in ghosts is suspended, or that we are a prey to conflicting beliefs. If so, our action would have revealed to us that our beliefs were not as genuine, or as strong, or as deeply ingrained, as we had supposed.

Mr. Bradley's second argument under this head is not a plagiarism, but a quibble. He actually appeals to "that class of ideas which influences our actions without seeming to be true. I refer to practical ideas, the representation of a desire which is now felt to be unsatisfied. It is certain that these now move us to active pursuit, and it is equally certain that they are not judged to be real; for, if they were, then for that reason they would fail to move us." On the strength of this passage Mr. Bradley may perhaps claim to have anticipated Professor Dewey's "practical judgments"; but he is clearly juggling with the ambiguity of "real." The desired ends which move us are *already* real as psychic facts, while they are *yet to be* realized in the external world.

(*c*) Practical influence is not the true *differentia* of judgment, but an "accident," because it would be "comic if the judgment, it will rain to-morrow, is the same as buying an umbrella to-day." It certainly would be, but not so comic as the misapprehension which regards this joke as a confutation of pragmatism. Mr. Bradley contends that "assertion and denial, together with the difference of truth and falsehood" are the true *differentia* of judgment, and that "there is something in them which falls outside the influence of ideas on the will." Pragmatic logic will assent to the first statement, and even insist that its truth, and the neglect thereof by the old logic's failure to differentiate truth from falsehood, were pre-

[6] Quoted above.

cisely what incited it; but as regards the second, it will distinguish, and claim once more to detect a confusion between the abstract judgment-form and the real judgment, a confusion which ignores that the latter must be purposive, selective, and therefore, volitional.

(*d*) True judgment has a *differentia* which precludes its reduction to "a mere practical attitude." "The practical influence of ideas must have degrees," but "Judgment is primarily logical, and as such has no degrees."

Once more we get Formalism, a confusion, and a series of half truths, which we are here opportunely told "are in strictness no truths at all." It may be said, doubtless, that in the abstract and "as such" judgment has no degrees; but is not to take it thus abstractly precisely the essential vice of formalism, against which pragmatic logic is a protest? And to transfer what may be said (in a sense) of the abstract paper "judgment" to the real judgment, made by a real person on a definite occasion, is a confusion which a humanist must never weary of exposing. So soon as logic is allowed to consider real judgments in their full concreteness, it becomes evident that the formal absoluteness of the assertion in judgment in no wise guarantees an equal absoluteness to the real meaning. I may declare "*A is B*" with every degree of confidence of which a mind is capable, from cocksureness to the most hesitant and provisional assent in the hope of repressing troublesome doubts. And my real meaning and intention is *not* to be understood as affirming the empty form and its merely verbal claim to certainty, but is to convey, if possible, the precise amount of assurance, with which I view the connection of A and B. The one thing I can *never* really mean is what alone the old logic will recognize as my meaning, *viz.*, to enunciate that *A is B* absolutely: for my judgment, whatever the strength of the confidence and belief in which it was made, must always have been relative to a real doubt. This doubt may have existed in my mind, and may continue to haunt me; or it may have been supposed to exist in the minds of those to whom the judgment was conveyed: but unless it was an answer to a question, and an attempt to settle it, the judgment would have been a superfluity and would not have been made.[7]

We must conclude, then, that whether or not Mr. Bradley has succeeded in annihilating his "Bain," his own arguments are by no means very sound or successful in themselves.

IV.

This conclusion, taken together with the spuriousness of the so-called "Bain" and our arguments for both these contentions, should

[7] *Cf.* my *Formal Logic*, pp. 173, 202.

suffice to dispose of the claim which sees in Mr. Bradley's polemic a prophetic confutation of pragmatic logic. But it may be well to clinch the matter by pointing, more constructively, to the positive features in judgment which irresistibly compel me (I will not venture to speak for the other pragmatists) to recognize its universal relation to practise. (1) It is imperative that the logician should get hold of a real judgment to examine, and not of an empty judgment-form, of which the study can only lead to verbalism. (2) Such a real judgment is always found to have a particular context and purpose, which connect it vitally with the action of its maker. (3) To understand its real meaning, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain both how he came to make it, and what he wants to do with it. (4) It is in fact his *personal act* throughout, and (5) its logical character is that of a *selection,* which has preferred it above its rivals and alternatives, and (6) constitutes it a *value-claim,* so that, *in effect though not in verbal form,* all judgments are really value-judgments,[8] and the distinction between "fact" and value becomes nugatory. (7) This claim, however, is never really final (despite its verbal finality), because (8) it must always be tested by such of its workings as are held to be relevant to its "truth." (9) Hence the truth-value of the truth-claim always depends in the end on the *consequences* to which it leads.

It will be obvious to the reader that *not one* of these essential (*i. e.,* important and vital) points is either made, implied, or prefigured by Mr. Bradley's "Bain." Nor are they confuted or even so much as mentioned by Mr. Bradley himself.[9]

It will be profitable, finally, to inquire how far Bain's real doctrine contains anticipations of pragmatism. Pragmatists will, of course, feel not jealousy, but gratitude towards Bain for his valuable analysis of the phenomena of belief, and will gladly accept it as far as it goes. In so far as he has made it clear to logicians that they must take into account the beliefs which necessarily accompany the act of judgment, he has certainly prepared the way for them. But it should not be overlooked that his problem was different from theirs. Their question was not *how are genuine to be distinguished from spurious beliefs?,* but *how is the truth-claim of a judgment to be tested?* and *what do we mean by its "truth"?* The test Bain proposed, *viz.,* willingness to act on the belief or the truth-claim, is an important one: for though it is not the absolute criterion an enlightened logic has ceased to hunt for, it does form a convenient and frequently applicable test of sincerity, and exposes much humbug and make-believe. It is not, however, coextensive with the

[8] *Cf.* this JOURNAL, Vol. XII., pp. 685–6.

[9] Nor yet by Mr. D. S. Robinson!

pragmatic test, nor the whole of it. It leaves out the reference to the *consequences* of acting on a belief, and the logical reaction of *success* or *failure* on the original belief, and consequently fails to connect the "true" with "satisfaction" and with the "good." Neither does it lay down the logical canon that *all truth-claims* must be tested. In short, it covers only a small part of the ground over which the pragmatic controversy has since extended.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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A NOTE ON THE NEEDS AND USES OF ENERGY MEASUREMENTS FOR WORK IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPTICS

A BRIEF discussion of this subject was given by us five years ago in an article, entitled "A Note on the Determination of the Retina's Sensitivity to Colored Light in Terms of Radiometric Units."[1] Since that time some dispute has arisen with regard to the comparative merits of the subjective and objective types of measurement of the stimulus light for work in psychological optics. Time alone can, of course, reveal the full range of needs and uses of the objective type of measurement. A few words in the way of general perspective, however, may not be out of place at this time.

Considered in its relation to the eye, two points of view may be recognized in the rating of lights. One of these is involved in their rating for the use of the eye as an organ of seeing. In such a rating it is obvious that the method should take into account all of the eye's peculiarities of response to the different wave-lengths of light. In the production of illuminating effects this is the work of photometry, which should be done by the eye or some instrument calibrated to give results in terms of the responses of the eye. Another and quite a different point of view, however, is involved in their rating for the purpose of investigating the eye's peculiarities or characteristics of response in every way in which it is capable of giving response. In such work it is obvious that the ultimate method of making the rating should be free from the peculiarities to be investigated, that is, should not be made by the eye itself. In general, in work of this kind, two needs arise. (1) A method of specification is required which will make possible an accurate and convenient reproduction of intensities from time to time and from laboratory to laboratory. The difficulty of doing this by photometry with lights differing widely as to wave-length, as do in most cases the stimuli employed in psychological optics, is too well known to need emphasiz-

ing here. Obviously what is needed for certitude in this work, is a measuring instrument which can be calibrated directly against the standard of radiation, or black body, and which is non-selective in its response to wave-length—not an instrument like the eye, the selenium cell, the photo-electric cell, or the photographic plate, the responses of which are not only selective to wave-length, but vary in their amounts of selectiveness with change of intensity of light, differ greatly in both of these regards (especially the eye) from instrument to instrument or from sense organ to sense organ, and can not be calibrated against the total of radiation of a black body.

The insistence on a subjective method of rating for standardizing purposes, when the objective method is available, is not only difficult to understand, but is entirely contradictory to current practise in other sense fields. No one would think, for example, of specifying, for the purpose of securing reproducibility, the weights used in an investigation of skin sensitivities in terms of the skin's own responses when the means of making the physical measurement is at hand; yet there should be more chance of successfully establishing from laboratory to laboratory a system of calibration of skin measurements in terms of some common standard than there is of accomplishing the analogous task in case of light. It is scarcely conceivable that the most ardent advocate of subjective ratings in case of light would recommend the substitution of the subjective for the objective method for work on the skin for the simple reason that it would be so undesirable as not to be tolerated unless, for want of an objective method, it was rendered absolutely necessary. With the objective method available from the beginning, the possibility of using the subjective method has not even been raised in work on the skin. And indeed the subjective method has been used in rating light intensities only because (*a*) for more than a hundred years no other method was available, and (*b*) it was desirable to rate lights for use in seeing by a method which gave results corresponding to the eye's powers of response. The former of these reasons for its use has now disappeared. Only the latter, with a few laboratory exceptions, remains and marks off for the subjective method of rating a separate and special field which is clearly recognized as such by physicists and the engineers dealing with the problem of lighting.

As a brief, however, for the continuation of the use of the eye for the measurement of its own stimuli, although such measurements would not be subjective, it may be claimed that in time it will be possible to calibrate the eye by means of the non-selective radiometers so that it can be used to measure the visible energies directly. For example, just as it is possible to measure a linear dimension with

a meter rod and to convert the results into terms of the English system, and *vice versa;* so it may be possible to measure the different wave-lengths of light by the eye and convert the results obtained into energy values. The difficulties in the way of this, as we have already pointed out, consist in differences in the sensitivity of different eyes for a given wave-length; the selectiveness of the eye's response to wave-length and to intensity and its variations in both of these regards from observer to observer; the lack of a fixed scale from observation to observation, even in the case of a single observer, *etc.* In short, to complete the analogy suggested above, it would be an exceedingly difficult task to convert measurements from the metric into the English system and *vice versa* if very few of the measuring rods employed represented the same amounts of linear space; if in case of a given rod the dimensions of some objects were underestimated and others overestimated and the magnitude of this underestimation and overestimation varied with the dimensions of the object measured by amounts as yet undetermined, *etc.,* as happens in case of the eye's evaluations of the wave-lengths of the visible spectrum. Obviously if the eye's ratings are to be converted into energy values, this conversion can come only after a very great deal of investigation and calibration against radiation standards by means, for example, of the non-selective radiometers, which but constitutes one of the subdivisions of what we have included under the second of the needs we are giving for energy measurements in the study of the responses of the eye. However, to represent the calibration as now completed and available for use instead of scarcely begun, as is being done in some quarters, is chimerical and visionary to a degree which we can consider compatible only with an inadequate knowledge and understanding of all that is involved in the problem.

(2) The second and perhaps more fundamental need for energy measurements for work on the eye is, as stated in the general heading, for a method of rating the stimulus which will make possible a quantitative comparison of the eye's power of response to its stimuli in every way in which it is capable of giving a response; for we can know the kind and amount of its selectiveness of reaction to the different wave-lengths of light only when they are compared with those of an instrument as a standard which shows equal power or capacity of response to all wave-lengths. Only with such an instrument, or rather with such an evaluation of the stimuli as a common or invariable standard to which to refer the eye's evaluations or responses, can the work of comparing its powers or peculiarities of response to its stimuli be put on a basis that can be called quantitative for a single eye or from eye to eye. To this it may be demurred, however, that in some problems it is required as one of the

features of the investigation that the stimuli have equal power to arouse the eye's response or sustain some subjective relation to each other. This need we have always freely recognized both in our work and in our recommendations.[2] It in no way conflicts with, however, or supplants the more fundamental one already given, but is rather supplementary to it in certain types of investigation; for even in the cases where the subjective relation is demanded to fulfil the requirements of the investigation there is still great need for the ultimate purposes of the science that the physical amounts of light required to produce this subjective relation for the given observer be determined and specified. Again to use the analogy of work on skin sensation, it would be a careless investigator indeed who would fail to specify, if it were possible to do so, the physical measure of the weights he used to give equal pressure responses, for example. In short, it seems a paradox that one should even feel the need to make a special pleading for the introduction of objective measurements into the work of psychological optics when it is the current practise to use objective ratings of the stimulus in every other field of psychological investigation in which it is possible to do so, the intensity ratings in vision and audition alone being the conspicuous outstanding exceptions and these being so only because adequate methods for making such ratings have been slow in coming.

As examples of needs for regulating the stimuli to give certain subjective relations we may quote here the following cases that we have already formally recognized. In a recent investigation of the comparative lags of the achromatic response to wave-length made in our laboratory, the stimuli employed were made photometrically equal and the amounts of light used to give these equal responses were measured radiometrically. The photometric equalizations were made because the data were wanted in an interpretation of the characteristic overestimations and underestimations found in the results of certain observers in photometry by the method of flicker as compared with their results by the equality of brightness method. In another case in a determination of whether stimuli which have the same power to arouse the achromatic response have also the same power to make the eye lose in its capacity to give this response as a result of prolonged stimulation, the stimuli were as a matter of course made subjectively equal as one of the essential conditions of the investigation; but again the amounts of light required to produce this subjective relation were determined radiometrically for the purpose of ultimate specification. Also in our

[2] See, for example, *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXIII., pp. 329–331.

original note on energy measurements we recognized quite broadly the possible need of establishing subjective relations between the stimuli used. For example, in discussing methods of determining after-image and contrast sensitivity, we state: "It is conceivable that two points of view may be held with regard to what is meant by after-image and contrast sensitivity. (1) After-image and contrast sensitivity may express a relation between the amount of light required to arouse after-image and contrast sensations and the unit of light used. (2) It may express a relation between the amount of light required to arouse the after-image and contrast sensations and the amount required to arouse the positive sensation."[3] In the former case the after-image or contrast sensations are treated as one of the eye responses the selectiveness of which to wave-length is to be determined; in the latter a figure is sought which expresses the relation between the after-image and contrast and the positive sensitivities. On the same page and the one following we say: "Similarly, two views may be held with regard to the determination of the comparative rates of fatigue, and of the development-time of sensation. (1) Lights equalized in energy may be used. (2) The energy of the lights may be made proportional to the sensitivity of the eye to the different colors." Also in discussing the investigation of the peripheral limits of sensitivity, we state: "(*a*) The limits may be considered in relation to the comparative sensitivity of the retina to the different colors. (*b*) They may be considered in relation to existing color theories. In the first of these problems the limits should be obtained with stimuli equalized in energy. So obtained, the results will constitute merely another expression of the comparative sensitivity of the retina to the different colors." "The second problem is more complicated and will be made the subject of a separate paper." Indeed, as these citations abundantly show, we have never failed to recognize that the stimuli in certain types of investigation must be made to conform to some type of subjective relation, but these investigations constitute in immediate importance only a minor part of the work that is to be done in getting a thorough knowledge of the eye's characteristics of response; and even in these investigations there is as great need of an invariable standard of reference as there is in any field, psychological or otherwise, where the value of quantitative work or measurement is recognized.

Perhaps the general character of the discussion will not be deviated from too widely if we add in conclusion a word on the determination of retinal sensitivities which will indicate in a concrete case the type of treatment that should in our opinion be given

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 329.

both to the response and to the stimulus, when possible, in quantitative work in psychological optics. If the sensitivity of the retina is to be measured in a way that is comparable with the measurement of the sensitivity of the physical recording instruments, two conditions must be fulfilled: (*a*) the amounts of response in terms of which the comparison is to be made must be numerically comparable; and (*b*) the amounts of stimulus used in arousing the response must also be numerically comparable or commensurable. The sensitivity of two galvanometers could not be compared, for example, were it not known that the divisions on the scale of each were either equal or commensurable; likewise the amounts of current used to produce the given deflections must be known in terms of the same or comparable units. With the introduction of the radiometric treatment of the stimulus the second of the above conditions is fulfilled, and for the first time in a way that can be considered quantitative to a degree that would be acceptable in rating the sensitivity of a physical instrument. With reference to the first condition we are confronted with a situation somewhat similar to that which obtains in heterochromatic photometry. That is, in general, five different quantities have been used or suggested in the work of measuring sensitivities (the liminal threshold, the just noticeable difference, the average error, equal amounts of response and equal sense differences), but only the last two of these conform to the requirement that is considered absolutely necessary in determining the sensitivity of a physical instrument, namely, that the amounts of response as well as the amounts of stimulus must be numerically comparable. Moreover, in the absence of sureness of principle in case of the other three, the empirical check of agreement in result with those that have the needed sureness of principle has never been offered; yet sensitivities are determined just as if this condition did not exist, comparisons are made and conclusions are drawn. In short it may not be out of place to call attention here to the looseness of thinking and practise that prevails more or less generally with regard to the work of determining physiological sensitivities as compared with the analogous physical determinations. For the sake of consistency it might well be urged either that this work be revised on the basis of the standards set for the physical instruments with all of the interchecking of methods that is needed, or that the term sensitivity with its definite quantitative connotation be abandoned in all cases in which this standard can not be lived up to.

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THE TELEOLOGICAL DELUSION

THE primate of Belgium wrote last October in a widely-published pastoral letter: "You are not to know if the world will last 1,000 years more, 10,000,000 years more; not whether you will die in your youth, or in middle age or in extreme old age. Only one thing is necessary, that you know your own soul and that in the all-powerful hands of the Master of Events you shall be the docile instruments . . . for the accomplishment of his will." The untoward events of the last two years Cardinal Mercier explains on familiar dualistic principles. "In the primitive plan of Providence passions were subjected to reason and would never have been permitted to intrude in the peace of families or of nations; but sin has overthrown this generous plan, . . . Pride and cupidity break into the world's balance, repression and armed defense are necessary for its reestablishment." But in accordance with the habit of the Christian dualist this thwarting of the divine will the Primate soon overlooks. "To worship God," he writes, "is to proclaim that God is God, . . . that all He does is well done."

This pastoral letter is not only an interesting reiteration of pre-Darwinian Christian philosophy. Given its background, it is a remarkable expression of some of the means taken again and again by the supernaturalist to give himself a sense of power and of mastery. If he is a Christian he achieves the assurance in three ways, through the conception and feeling of self-control or self-mastery, through belittling the control of others, his mundane masters, through glorifying the power of his own gods, a vicarious, but limitless means of intensifying self-esteem. "If you are at the mercy of events," writes the cardinal, "when you should command them it is because you obey your emotions, though you have the right and power to be their masters. Silence them." It is the cry of self-will, the will to power of the ascetic. "Whatever happens to you, there is in you something which no person or no thing can touch—that is your soul." Invasion or deportation becomes from such a standpoint an insignificant occurrence and the power of the invader or deporter of little moment. "As to real power, power through God, it is yours," writes Cardinal Mercier, "because you identify yourself with an omnipotent Deity. This soul which is yours, of which you are the master—will commune with God, if you desire it—it will be embraced by Him. . . . Each historic period is a page from the divine book of Providence. We write it, but the strong will of the All-Powerful holds the writing instrument." That it is the other way round Cardinal Mercier could not be expected to realize. In order to function properly in the mind of the devout, the principle of

divine vicariousness must be ignored. The readiest way to ignore it is by inversion, making man the instrument of God instead of God the instrument of man.

Cardinal Mercier is undisturbed by any suggestion that God is the instrument of man. And despite the exigencies of his dualism he is also undisturbed by any suggestion that in any way God's power, and consequently man's power, is limited. He is, we must remember, a Catholic theologian. Protestant theologians are less determinedly self-protective. Weakly they listen now and then to the voice of science. And they pay up for it with the panic that comes to any one who apprehends that his source of power is threatened. Of such panic was no small degree in the attitude of the Protestant Church towards the doctrine of evolution. Evolution appeared to undermine the argument of design, of divine purpose. Evolutionary theory might make the world or a part of it seem less of a mystery, but to the theologians that was not the point. The point was their own sense of having something to say about the mystery. They did not mind the mystery so much if only they had a finger in it. And this they had on their theory of their influence with the arbitrary personal designer of the seemingly chaotic universe. And so in self-defense the theologians raged against evolution—until they saw a way out.

Their way out was through a still larger degree of vicariousness and through stretching the argument of design. The law of evolution was conceived of as an instrument of God and consequently as an instrument of man. Evolution soon became indeed an even more pliable instrument than deity. The divine purpose, in spite of rationalizing, would give trouble. It was erratic and even at times incomprehensible. The law of evolution seemed more dependable, and to read your purposes into it took less ingenuity. You had only to consider yourself the fittest, for example, to argue that you were the proper survivor and then did you not cooperate with the will of nature by suppressing the unfit, just as you had cooperated with the will of God by suppressing the wicked or the impious? In eliminating lower types, lower classes, lower races you merely took nature's way, accelerating her a little perhaps. And this direct participation in nature's power gave an even greater satisfaction than the more indirect forms of participation with God. Eugenics and a colonial policy are even more satisfying to a desire for power than vow and sacrifice.

The satisfactions of eugenics and of pride of race have not yet flowered. Science has but begun to put a blight upon them, a blight they will long withstand. Meanwhile ambitious evolutionists are seeking, have sought other outlets for theory and energy. The theory

of racial evolution yields to a theory of cultural evolution, nature to nurture. Advanced evolutionists practise, so to speak, no longer in the name of God or of nature, but in the name of culture. Society, the progress of society, becomes the goal of their enterprising and masterful spirit.

Not that the control of society was not long since a goal for the ambitious. But the ambition was self-limiting, for it was of necessity concerned with keeping society as it was. The sense of power that comes through social control in primitive culture appears to come from resisting change, or in so far as it is inevitable, in pretending to regulate it. The seasons, weather, sun and moon, vegetation, animal life—all are regulated or promoted by ceremonials. Human life, conception, birth, mating, health, death, the whole round of human life is also regulated by ceremonialism. Change, growth or decay, is ignored until it has to be met, then a ceremony is performed to give people the feeling that it is they, after all, who have willed the change. Through ceremonialism, ritual for nature, and ritual for human life, people keep their sense of control. Ceremonialism like supernaturalism is an escape from reality.

But social improvement and education are much wider fields than social conservation and discipline. The idea of social progress is more satisfying to the will to power than ceremonialism. That is why in recent decades the conservative, the ritualist, has taken a back seat. Even contemporaneous pseudo forms of conservatism would not occur were not the struggle against progressivism of itself somewhat satisfying. But the time is not distant, perhaps it is at hand, when, progressives having ceased to pay further attention to conservatives, everybody will call himself a progressive. The arch anti-social then will be the skeptic of progress. Even to-day you are found much more aggravating when you say you do not believe in social progress than when you say you do not believe in God. Social progress has become, as Trotter would put it, a certitude, not a matter of knowledge.

The assumptions necessary for comfortable progressivism have long since been made—an humble beginning for culture, marked degrees of cultural differentiation, conscious social direction.

As in the case of a racial evolution, belief in cultural evolution requires for culture a low starting-point. Pride of race was injured by the idea of simian origin as long as the dogma of racial homogeneity was uppermost, but as soon as the races were differentiated on an evolutionary basis pride of race was immensely flattered by thoughts of simian ancestry or kinship. "The lower races are indeed ape-like," says the racial evolutionist, "but we, the higher race, long since evolved, of course, beyond that stage." Similarly the pride of

cultural evolutionists is flattered by lowly social beginnings. It makes the road already travelled seem longer, more imposing. Consequently the humbleness of so-called savage culture is a welcome conception. The evolutionary publicist, and what publicist is not evolutionary, clings to the wild savage. The wild savage is his *point d' appuis,* his indispensable starting-point. The wilder, the more degraded the savage, the more credit to the civilized. The more backward the backward races, the more advanced the chosen, the favored races. And so the savage, or, as the more sophisticated are given to calling him, primitive man, is held to be lacking in whatever traits his civilized defender most values. Primitive man, we hear, is improvident and thriftless, he is a creature of impulse lacking in self-control, his sex habits are promiscuous, in fact he has no sex habits, we have even been told by the religious that he has no religion.

Even the irreligious who hold that primitive man was a mere complex of religiosity assert that his religion was of a lower type than that of the so-called historic religions. Primitive institutions like primitive human nature are called upon to supply a perspective. The institutions of a modern society will seem more evolved if to them the institutions of primitive societies are a contrast. Posit autocracy, for example, for primitive society, or promiscuity, and democracy and monogamy[1] seem the results of culture evolved to a high degree. If democracy or monogamy be made to appear the unique results of modern culture so much the better.

So much the better, too, because all encroachments upon democracy or monogamy or any so-called modern institution may seem to be a reversion to an earlier type, a social survival, a relic of the unevolved past. Religion, for example, becomes a superstition; any obstacle to your progress, mere conservatism; Satan is rechristened Anachronism. Thus from this point of view there is no need of tolerating any social traits or habits or tendencies which run counter to your own.

Modern culture, then, is held to be an evolution from low cultural stages. But the satisfaction of the cultural evolutionist is incomplete unless he see himself, like the racial evolutionist, a contributor to evolution. Now he sees himself in this rôle more easily if he sees in it likewise his cultural predecessors. In other words, the theory of purposive social activity from the beginnings of society is a comfortable theory. Belief in the rationality of freshly initiated law or mode of life more or less necessitates belief in the rationality

[1] The way the promiscuity theory held its own for a time in scientific circles is as amusing an illustration of the influence of social pressure on science as any I know except perhaps the attitude of many scientists that science is a purely modern development, that outside of civilization there is no science.

of law or custom when it originated. Custom becomes maladjusted, of course, and antiquated, but in the beginning, holds the modern publicist, it was well-planned, serviceable, rational. Belief in the rational origin of custom is as important to the reforming publicist as belief in the divine origin of custom to the theocrat.

The spread of ethnological knowledge will undermine the purposive theory of cultural beginnings; it will undermine the theory of lowly cultural beginnings; it may even shock certain convictions about the differentiations of cultural groups into lower and higher: but faith in cultural progress, our paramount contemporaneous faith, I doubt if any amount of popularization of ethnology will shake. In that very popularization new foundations for the faith will probably be found. As long as our sense of progress gives us the glow religion once gave, we will protect it, protect it quite as ardently as supernaturalists like Cardinal Mercier protect their sense of the plan of Providence.

Witness the protection given our sense of progress in these passing days. See how it is recovering from the great shock inflicted by the European War. The supreme horror of the war lay in its assault on our sense of progress. It threatened to break down our faith, as we said, in civilization. Perhaps for a brief period that faith was indeed shattered or rather some of its foundations, but then, just as the human body builds up tissue to replace tissue lost or injured, so our faith in progress reconstructed for itself necessary points of view. Very early the faith-destroying causes of the war were obscured by the ends of the war. In the ends of the war were seen the ends of civilization. The war was a war for civilization—to Allies and pro-Allies and to Germans and pro-Germans alike.[2] Then when the ends of the war became from their obscurity useless to faith, faith seized on the effects of the war for consolation and support. The consequences of the war, we daily hear, will be important and beneficent, a world more liberal and more peaceful will emerge[3]—England

[2] A little behind Europe, as usual, America has begun to reformulate the slogan of "a war for civilization." Only the other day the presidents of eight women's colleges declared: "Although we believe that the settlement of international difficulties by war is fundamentally wrong, we recognize that in a world crisis such as this it may become our highest duty to defend by force the principles upon which Christian civilization is founded." (*The N. Y. Times*, Mar. 31, 1917.) [It is difficult to understand this except as an assertion that to act in a way you believe to be fundamentally wrong is a principle of Christian civilization. The manifesto, however, is probably not meant to be analyzed.] Since writing the foregoing, the American mill of idealism has turned out unsurpassing products—the war has become a war to end war, a war for democracy, a war to set the world free.

[3] *Cf.* editorial in the *New Republic*, March 31, 1917.

will be class-free, Russia[4] democratized, Europe purified, Feminism triumphant, Internationalism founded, and a Peace laid that will endure forever[5] even if it pass understanding.

I am, in fact, unable to see how peace can be born of militarism or to differentiate between militarism and militarism, but for the moment I hold no brief against militarism. My emphasis is upon the enormity of the claims made for the outcome of the war and more particularly upon the need felt to make such claims, upon the urge to rationalize war. To quote again from Mercier's pastoral, "Divine Providence . . . finds . . . the means to transform this world, troubled and embittered by the sin of our first parents and by our personal crimes, into a work of redemption which surpasses in the grandeur of moral perfection its own first plan." Now for Divine Providence read civilization expressing itself as war and we have: "War finds the means to transform this world troubled and embittered by savage survivals and by the weakness and faults of human nature, into a work of redemption which surpasses in the grandeur of moral perfection its own first plan."

God's purpose, nature's purpose, society's purpose—that is the course of teleology, of that science which of all the sciences or pseudo-sciences appears to be the most indispensable to human composure, perhaps to human happiness.

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[4] The egg of Russian revolution has been hatched out by the war, but was the egg not laid years ago? Russian revolution has been a nationalistic movement. The Russian autocracy was anti-national. If the national spirit is ready to express itself democratically a national war will no doubt hasten, as it has hastened in Russia, the birth of democracy. None would dispute that a national war might be expected to foster whatever contributes to nationalism or even masks under it. I have in mind the expected enfranchisement of English-women. It is proposed not because of any humanist consideration, but because of the women's national service.

[5] Very uncommon is realism such as that voiced by Charles P. Trevelyan. "The vitality of Europe is ebbing away. It is not the loss of money and of credit. It is not only the waste and desolation of provinces during the war and the economic catastrophes and political upheavals which will everywhere follow in its wake. It is not only the millions of dead and maimed among the young men. But it is the complete collapse of the old national standards. . . . After the war tyranny and militarism . . . will cling [in Germany] with fierce tenacity to their old strongholds and in Britain to their new-found opportunity." But even Trevelyan suggests that there may be "an instinctive popular reaction against them." (An open letter published in the United States, December 5, 1916.)

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Psychology of the Organized Group Game. MABEL JANE REANEY. Monograph Supplement, The British Journal of Psychology, IV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1916. Pp. 76.

An analysis of the psychological factors involved in the "organized group game" is made from (1) the purely psychological and philosophical and from (2) the experimental points of view. An extensive survey of the literature, including the many theories of play, is given and a comprehensive bibliography is appended. The writer concludes "that play is a universal phenomenon found amongst animals and man and that its complexity varies with the stage of development of the species and the individual; that the plays of children can be divided into definite periods which coincide with the periods of race development; that the play of animals and children makes use of instincts and by modifying them intelligently trains for the adult life; that the theories suggested account, respectively, for different types of play; that the earliest forms can be explained by the surplus energy theory, the later forms by the practise theory combined with the recapitulation theory and much of adult play by the recreation theory; that the traditional games of all countries have arisen as the results of the imitation of the serious occupations of the life of the period; . . . that the organized group game as the highest form of motor play represents the tribal stage of the race; . . . that the final development of the group game seems to have arisen as the accompaniment to civilization and has been evolved as a means of giving scope to those instinctive tendencies which are balked by such civilization; that the evolution of this kind of game appears in the race which has inherited from its forbears the instincts of rivalry and pugnacity to a marked degree."

As result of civilization there has been a dissociation of ideas and a definite group of ideas formed around the concept "group game." The fascination of the "organized group game" in modern times can be explained on the lines that it has been evolved to satisfy the balked dispositions of a warlike race under the conditions of civilization, and that the cult of "playing the game" has been established as a national habit of thought by suggestion resulting in "tradition."

In the experimental part of the research, a questionnaire was sent to 1,000 of the leading public and secondary schools in England. The questions asked were:

1. (*a*) Do you consider that any evidence exists to show that mental development takes place as a result of definite training in a group game, such as football, hockey, cricket, netball, *etc.*?

(*b*) If so can you quote a definite case?

2. (*a*) Do you consider that there is any relation between play ability and general ability?

(*b*) Do the boys and girls who excel in games show any tendency to be above or below the average standard of intelligence?

(*c*) Do those who show marked apathy towards, or fail to reach any standard of efficiency in them, tend to be above or below this average standard of intelligence?

3. Are you aware of any special mental characteristics which mark respectively: Part I.: The best football players, the best cricket players, the best hockey players, the best netball players, the best lacrosse players; Part II.: The boys and girls who show least aptitude for playing games?

4. What game do you consider most valuable from an educational point of view?

5. From your experience, would you say that there is any special age at which group games appeal most strongly?

6. Do you think the school games should be organized in the upper school by the children themselves, or by a teacher?

7. Do you consider that games should be compulsory?

Six hundred and thirty-nine answers were received from 487 schools. The general conclusions are: (1) There *is* definite evidence to show that mental development takes place as a result of training in group games. A sufficient number of definite cases can be quoted to prove the above statement. (2) There is a definite relation between play ability and general ability. Girls and boys who play games well are on the whole *above* the average intelligence, or of average intelligence, but seldom below it. Girls and boys who show marked apathy to games or play them badly are on the whole *below* average intelligence. (3) The following qualities are marked characteristics of the best players: Alertness, rapidity of thought and action, judgment, resourcefulness. Children who show little aptitude for games tend to be slow, dull, and slack. (4) Football is the game of greatest educational value for boys; hockey for girls. (5) The games appeal most strongly to boys above twelve years of age, and to girls above thirteen. (6) The consensus of opinion is in favor of organization by the children, under supervision. (7) Games should be compulsory.

In general the writer concludes that there is a correlation between general ability and play ability for group games. The questionnaire method has had adverse criticism, however.

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The Modern High School. CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON, Editor. Revised edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. Pp. 848.

Books of composite authorship are likely to have small unity, even though each contribution bear directly on the same subject. It is pleasing, therefore, to find that this volume, of thirty chapters, by almost as many writers, has a unity, that of the spirit of the modern high school.

The four parts deal, respectively, with "The Institutional Relationships of the High School," "The More Intimate Specialized Relationships of High School Work," "Definite Internal Expressions of the Social Nature and Socializing Function of the High School," and "Additional Socializing Functions of the Modern High School." More specifically, the book treats of the high school legal status, its relation to lower and higher schools and to the community; home and school associations; the administration of social activities, school clubs, and athletics; vocational guidance, *etc.* It is obvious from this enumeration that the book is limited in size only by the inventiveness of the editor, his ability to find authors, and the physical restrictions made by the publisher.

That the book has been successful is evidenced by the new edition. This contains one entirely new chapter by Dean Cubberley, of Stanford University, and Inspector Didcoct, of the University of Illinois, on "The Legal Status of the High School." The scholarship and care of these authors insure an accurate chapter. All other changes in the book are of a minor nature.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. January, 1917. *Charactères généraux de la philosophie française* (pp. 1–13): V. DELBOS. – The notes of an opening lecture to a course on French thought given at the Sorbonne in 1915–1916. In studying "the original elements of French philosophy, I should like to show in what France is revealed in its ways of philosophizing as well as in its doctrines, independent of English or German influence," the author wrote M. Blondel in November, 1915. *Sur les rapports logiques des concepts et des propositions* (pp. 15–58): L. COUTURAT. – Classic logic rests on the fundamental notion of the concept, but

logistic considers this notion as derived and subordinate to the more simple notion of the judgment. *La logique de la médecine, d'après Cabanis* (pp. 59–73): F. COLONNA D'ISTRIA. – Although Cabanis may appear superficially a continuer of the ideas of Condillac, his work is really turned toward the future and nineteenth-century science. *Études Critiques. L'éducation et la pédagogie experiméntale:* A. REYMOND. *Questions pratiques. Une idée en péril: humanité, humanitarisme, humanisme:* TH. RUYSSEN. *Nécrologie.*

Seward, A. C., Editor. Science and the Nation: Essays by Cambridge Graduates with an Introduction by the Right Honorable Lord Moulton. Cambridge: University Press. 1917. Pp. xxii + 328. 5 s.

Sidis, Boris. Philistine and Genius. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1917. Pp. xxvii + 122. $1.00.

Starch, Daniel. Experiments in Educational Psychology. Revised edition. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1917. Pp. ix + 204. $1.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION AND ITS PROGRAMMES

AT the last meeting of the American Philosophical Association a resolution was adopted requesting the president to appoint a committee of twelve to consider the question of programme. This committee has been appointed with Professor Lovejoy as chairman, and has arrived at certain decisions in regard to the next meeting of the association. But as probably this committee is likely to go on to make recommendations regarding programmes for future meetings, it seems desirable that there should be some general discussion of this question, especially as the committee is so large and its members so widely scattered that it is practically impossible that it should meet to consider the subject.

The American Philosophical Association has now been in existence for sixteen years. During the last half of this period the number of its members has increased rapidly; but there seems some ground for fearing that interest in its meetings is not so strong or so general as it was during the earlier years. If this dimunition of interest on the part of a considerable number of members who formerly took an active part in the association is an actual fact, I do not think it necessarily follows that the programmes of our recent meetings furnish its sole and sufficient explanation. But what is undoubted is the existence not only of loss of interest, but in some quarters of

a mild sense of grievance. I believe that I am not overstating the case in saying that a good many members think that there has been a distinct loss both in the interest and usefulness of the meetings of the association in recent years through the subordination of the other parts of the programme to the discussion of some specific subject, of interest to a particular group, and oftentimes defined so narrowly in terms of the presuppositions of that group as to render the discussion unmeaning, and to a considerable extent unintelligible, to others. That at least is my own opinion, and it is based on the experience of several meetings where a major part of the time was devoted to discussions such as I have described. Personally I have always maintained that the meetings are abundantly worth while apart from the programme. I recognize the difficulty of providing through the formal programme something of interest to every one. But I suppose that however much importance one attaches to the social and informal side of the meetings, one has to admit that the programme is something of the greatest consequence, and that upon it in the long run the existence of the association depends. I think, then, that we should seriously consider what are the important things which it is possible for the association to accomplish through its meetings and how the programme may best be adapted to the accomplishment of these ends.

At the first meeting of the association, in 1902, I tried to emphasize the importance of keeping in view certain fundamental objects, in an address entitled, "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association."[1] I do not know that I should now subscribe to every word of that address, but in general I believe that the principles which it lays down are true and are of importance in connection with the questions now under consideration. As I hope that at least the members of the committee will read this address, I will quote from it only a single sentence, but this I think expresses its central idea: "The promotion of philosophical scholarship and research is the only object capable of affording a purpose common to all the members of the association, and an interest which is likely to be serious and lasting" (p. 231). That sentence indicates where it is essential to lay the emphasis in our future meetings.

But our existing difficulties and discontents may be said to have arisen from an effort to realize the purpose indicated by the quotation. A number of members felt, I think, that the time devoted to the reading of miscellaneous papers and to such discussion as they might happen to call out, was very largely wasted. As it was sometimes said, "philosophy does not get anywhere by such a procedure."

[1] Published in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XL., pp. 219 ff.; also included in the *Proceedings* of the first meeting of the association.

It was hoped by setting to work more systematically, by "organizing" a discussion which should be continued through two or three sessions,—prescribing the channels in which it should run, and defining the terms to be employed—to compel the opposing forces to abandon their trenches and engage in open battle at a fixed predeterminable point. And if such an engagement could be brought about, so it was argued, there ought to be some definable result—a victory for one side or the other, and the consequent acceptance on the part of the association of a final philosophical truth, which as the "fruit" of the discussion would, of course, be a comforting mark of progress and might enable the "philosopher" to hold up his head in a company of "scientists."

It is obvious enough that this point of view, when carried out to such a length as I have suggested (and I have tried to set down soberly the courageous hopes of its representatives as I have heard them expressed) is nothing but scholasticism over again. It is possible to find interesting parallels between the disputations of the medieval schools and those which have been occupying us, both in respect to terminology and to the character of the problems. No one who was present can ever forget the Harvard meeting in 1911, when the battle ranged around the existence of tables, and the nature of the stick in the pool of water, and the definitions of "entities," and "subsistences," and whether knowledge changes the character of its object, or two realities occupy the same space at the same time! But scholastic or not, there was something fine in this exhibition. The definitions propounded, wonderful both for subtility and comprehensiveness, and the divisions and subdivisions which filled the blackboards, showed that the modern spirit had not dulled the interest of philosophers in formal distinctions or enfeebled their power to propound exact definitions. I do not mean to satirize unkindly discussions of this character. They have been entered into with a seriousness and an effort at exact thought that must command respect, and they have been carried on in a spirit that is altogether admirable. But the extreme artificiality that has been introduced into the discussions by the attempt to define formally the precise limits of the question at issue, and in some cases the meaning of terms to be employed, has had two unfortunate consequences. In the first place, in so far as the restrictions have been observed the outcome of the discussion has necessarily been barren; and secondly, those who have approached the problem under discussion from some other angle than that of the "programme committee"; or who are more familiar with the terminology of classical philosophy than with that of some very "modern" contribution, have simply found themselves

excluded from all possibility of participating in the meetings or even understanding the discussion.

There is, I am well aware, at the bottom of this disagreement regarding the most profitable form of programme for our meetings, a difference of philosophical theory in regard to the nature of truth and the logic by means of which progress may be made in its attainment. I do not think that at present at least there is any liklihood of our coming to see eye to eye with regard to these questions. But I am confident that we can without difficulty reach a practical agreement in regard to our meetings which will at once remove the grounds of existing discontent and also emphasize more than before the idea of cooperating to promote scholarship and research in philosophy.

There would probably be general agreement among the members of the association quite irrespective of any philosophical theory they may hold, that a closely defined and specialized form of philosophical discussion can be carried on successfully only among the members of a group who accept in common (at least provisionally) certain assumptions, and who are sufficiently familiar with one another's accepted logic and terminology to concentrate attention upon the details and technique of the arguments employed. It is evident that the membership of our association does not constitute such a group. Usually one finds that such discussions are most worth while when carried on informally in conversation with a small group of friends; and probably every one values the opportunities afforded by the meetings for such intimate discussion of particular points.

But since we have a considerable group of members who believe that they can most profitably employ a large share of the days devoted to the meetings in "close and prolonged debate," why should not simultaneous sections be organized during certain sessions of the association's meetings? I believe that this would be better than any attempt to hold together by compromising, or "splitting the difference." There would, if this proposal were adopted, still be sessions of the association, as a whole, and I hope discussions in which all might share, but there would be a real gain in division for certain purposes: in providing within the association itself distinct organs for different kinds of work. I believe that my friends, to whom I have just alluded with admiration as modern scholastics and formalists, feel that they have been so hampered by the prejudices of some of the "tenderminded," of whom they wish to be most considerate, that the "organized discussion" has never had an opportunity to show what it is really capable of in the way of establishing true propositions. But if the proposal I have made were adopted, they would be free to develop without hindrance the method of

philosophizing that seems to them most fruitful. And those who believe in a less formally defined mode of cooperation, and who perhaps attach more importance to viewing contemporary problems in the light of the great historical systems, would also be able to do something to promote a form of philosophical scholarship which, through the great emphasis laid upon the discussion, has very largely been lost sight of in our recent meetings.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE following have been elected honorary corresponding members of the Aristotelian Society: Professor Emile Boutroux, Dr. Benedetto Croce, Professor John Dewey, and Professor Harald Höffding.

PROFESSOR RALPH BARTON PERRY, of Harvard University, is teaching in the University of Chicago Summer School.

DR. WALTER F. DEARBORN has been promoted to a full professorship in psychology at Harvard University.

DR. A. H. SUTHERLAND, of the University of Illinois, has been appointed instructor in psychology in Yale University.

PROFESSOR R. P. ANGIER has been advanced to the grade of professor in psychology at Yale University.